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Abstract 
Recent changes to the EU Emissions Trading System introduce structural changes regarding the 
initial distribution of emissions allowances, which are worth tens of billions of euros. A key 
change is the expanding role for auctions, which account for about half of the allowance 
allocation now and will be a growing share going forward. The use of revenue from auctions is a 
decision left to EU Member States and appears increasingly important. Well over half of auction 
revenue to date has been directed to energy and climate related purposes. Further, we do not find 
evidence that Member States have used state aid to electricity-intensive firms to strategically 
support domestic industry. The trading system is evolving in a way that is likely to improve its 
performance, but there remain important questions related the future price of allowances and the 
distribution and use of asset value created under the trading system.  
 
Key Words: auction, cap and trade, European Union, EU ETS, allocation, climate change, 
policy  
JEL Classification Numbers:  H23, P48, Q54 
                                                 
∗ Löfgren is an associate professor at the Department of Economics at the University of Gothenburg; Burtraw is the 
Darius Gaskins Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future; Wråke is head of the Energy Unit at IVL; and 
Malinovskaya is a research assistant at Resources for the Future. The authors appreciate financial support from the 
Mistra INDIGO research program. Research assistance by Oskar Falk, Diana Ivanova, Nicklas Nordfors, and Haben 
Tekie on earlier versions of this paper is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Administrators of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) recently introduced changes 
to the system that affect the initial distribution of emissions allowances. A key change is the 
expanding role for auctions, which will yield billions of euros in revenue. From a policy 
perspective, understanding the potential consequences of various approaches to the use of the 
auction revenues is critical because this has distributional and strategic impacts both within and 
between Member States. The trading system is evolving in a way that is likely to improve its 
performance, but there remain important questions related the future price of allowances and the 
distribution and use of asset value created under the trading system.  
The introduction of a cap assigns a scarcity value to the opportunity to emit and thereby 
has created an asset in the form of emissions allowances. Each EU allowance (EUA) enables the 
holder to emit one metric tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2). The total value of allowances has 
varied with their price, approaching 10 billion euros in 2013 and 2014 and more than 30 billion 
euros in some previous years. Using auctions to initially distribute emissions allowances has the 
potential to collect large financial value for EU Member States. In phase 1 (2005–2007) and 
phase 2 (2008–2012) of the ETS, about 97% of emissions allowances—and the associated 
financial value of those allowances—were distributed for free to incumbent firms. That has 
changed in phase 3 (2013–2020), when roughly half of the allowances will be distributed 
through an auction. Although free distribution is still substantial, auctioning is the default 
allocation method and will have an expanding role going forward. 
Important changes that were made to the EU ETS before the third phase of the program 
(2013–2020)1 include the following: 
• the introduction of a centralized system for setting the annual cap on the number of new 
emissions allowances to be issued; 
• an expansion of the scope of the scheme to include more industrial activities and other 
greenhouse gases apart from CO2; 
                                                 
1 These changes result from amendments to the ETS Directive 2003/87/EC. 
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• an expanded role for auctions and the identification of auctions as the default way of 
distributing emissions allowances; 
• the elimination in principle of free allocation to electricity production, with exceptions 
discussed below;  
• the implementation of harmonized system-wide rules based on product-specific 
emissions rate benchmarks for free allocation of emissions allowances to industry; 
• set aside of 300 million allowances in the New Entrants Reserve (NER) to fund the 
deployment of innovative renewable energy technologies as well as carbon capture and 
storage, known as the NER 300 program;2 and 
• changes in the allowed use of international credits for compliance. 
The next section of the paper addresses the basic architecture of the program, including 
the determination of the cap on the annual distribution of emissions allowances. Section 3 
describes the magnitude of financial value created under the trading program and how the initial 
distribution of that value has changed in phase 3. Section 4 describes in more detail the growing 
role of auctions. Section 5 reviews how Member States have used the revenue from auctions. 
Section 6 outlines state aid measures introduced to reduce some of the indirect costs that the 
system imposes on large electricity consumers. Section 7 concludes.  
2. The Basic Architecture of the EU ETS in Phase 3 
During phase 1 and phase 2 (2005 to 2012), the emissions cap was established in an 
indirect manner based on decentralized decisions taken by individual Member States. Each 
Member State was required to draw up a national allocation plan (NAP) containing a list of all 
stationary installations to be included in the ETS and the proposed allocation of emissions 
allowances to each installation for each year. The NAPs constituted the aggregate cap over 
covered facilities and were reviewed by the Commission in each phase to verify that they were 
consistent with the emissions reduction targets for the EU and the criteria established in an annex 
to the Emissions Trading Directive, as well as with the EU rules on state aid and competition.3 
As a result of the phase 1 review, the Commission requested that some Member States make 
                                                 
2 European Commission, 2015a. 
3 European Commission, 2015b. 
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changes to their NAPs because it was concerned that their proposed allocation plans would 
jeopardize the achievement of the Kyoto targets and allow the Member States to intervene in the 
market after the allocation was done to redistribute allowances. The Commission also made an 
effort to make the process of creating NAPs simpler and more transparent in phase 2.4 
2.1 The Introduction of a Centralized System for Setting the Cap 
A major change in phase 3 was the replacement of the NAP process with a centralized 
system for setting the emissions cap. In July 2010, in its Decision 2010/384/EU, the Commission 
determined the cap for 2013 based on the current scope of the EU ETS—that is, the installations 
covered in the 2008–2012 period.5 The determination of the number of allowances issued in 
2013 applied an annual factor for reducing the cap to an amount determined by a calculation 
based on the following elements:6 
• the ETS-wide average annual quantity of allowances that have been issued from 2008 to 
2012;  
• the average annual quantity of allowances issued to installations that opted in to the 
trading system from 2008 to 2012;7 
• the quantity of allowances that accounts for the extended scope of the ETS to include 
additional installations in 2013 that emitted the following greenhouse gases: 
o CO2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia, and aluminum; 
o N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic, and glyocalic acid; and 
o perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from the aluminum sector; and 
• a deduction of the quantity of allowances associated with emissions from installations 
that opted out from the ETS.8  
                                                 
4 European Commission, 2015b. 
5 European Commission, 2015c. 
6 European Commission, 2015c. 
7 Article 24 of the EU ETS Directive enables Member States to expand the coverage of the ETS by exercising an 
option to include in the trading program activities, greenhouse gases not originally covered by the scheme, 
installations in sectors covered by the ETS that operate below defined capacity limits, and installations in sectors not 
covered by the EU ETS. See Ellerman et al. (2010a) for a detailed discussion of how the opt-in provision was used 
in phase 1 and early in phase 2. 
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Because the cap for 2013 is calculated from the midpoint of the period 2008 to 2012 (i.e., 
2010), the annual emissions cap reduction factor of 1.74 percent (in absolute figures, 38,264,246 
allowances per year) was applied three times (for 2011, 2012, and 2013) to arrive at the total 
ETS-wide quantity of allowances (cap) for 2013 of 2,084,301,856 allowances.9 If this linear 
reduction factor is applied to the cap in each year in phase 3, as required by current regulations, 
then by the end of phase 3 in 2020, this process will result in a 21 percent cut in emissions from 
installations in the EU ETS compared with 2005 levels.10 At the start of phase 4 in 2021, the 
annual linear reduction factor will increase to 2.2 percent, as agreed upon by EU leaders in 
October 2014 as part of the 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.11  
2.2 Expansion of the Scope of the ETS 
When the ETS started in 2005, it covered only CO2 emissions and the 25 EU Member 
States. In 2008, additional installations from participating Member States were covered by the 
scheme, due to the termination of the Article 27 temporary opt-out provision and to the 
clarification of the definition of combustion installations. Further, a number of countries decided 
to opt in N2O-emitting installations.12,13 In addition, a range of new sectors and source categories 
have been added, as listed in Table 1, including in particular installations emitting N2O and 
PFCs.14,15  
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Article 27 of the first 2003 EU ETS Directive allowed Member States to exercise an option to exclude certain 
installations from the ETS during phase 1. Originally, this temporary opt-out provision was meant to give 
installations that were subject to specific constaints more time to transition to the ETS scheme. However, Article 27 
in the amended 2009 Directive also allowed for the exclusion of small installations and hospitals subject to the same 
measures from the ETS in order to help those installations avoid administrative burdens and costs (Climate Policy 
Section Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, and Environmental Protection Agency, 
2011).  
9 Note that the absolute number of allowances established in the Commission Decision 2010/634/EU was 
2,039,152,882 allowances. It was later updated to 2,084,301,856 allowances (European Commission, 2015d). 
10 European Commission, 2015c. 
11 European Commission, 2015e. 
12 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 9a(1). 
13 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 24(1). 
14 European Environment Agency, 2015a. 
15 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Annex I. 
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Table 1. Expansion of Program Scope in Phase 3 
New regulated activity Regulated greenhouse gases  
Production of primary aluminium CO2 and perfluorocarbons 
Production of nitric acid CO2 and nitrous oxide 
Production of adipic acid CO2 and nitrous oxide 
Production of glyoxal and glyocylic acid CO2 and nitrous oxide 
Production of ammonia CO2 
Production of bulk organic chemicals by cracking, reforming, 
partial or full oxidation, or similar processes CO2 
Production of hydrogen (H2) CO2 
 
The geographic scope of the ETS has also changed. In 2007, the last year of phase 1, Bulgaria 
and Romania joined the 25 EU Member States. At the beginning of phase 2, in 2008, 
Liechtenstein and Norway were added. At the beginning of phase 3, in 2013, Croatia and Iceland 
entered the EU ETS. Thus, the EU ETS currently covers 31 countries in the European Economic 
Area, including 28 EU Member States and 3 Members of the European Free Trade Association 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). This sequence of changes in coverage and scope is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Scope of the EU ETS since 2005  
 
Source: European Environment Agency, 2015a. 
2.3 Regulation of the Aviation Sector  
The European Commission set a separate cap on emissions from the aviation sector that 
is equivalent to 97 percent of historical aviation emissions in 2012, declining to 95 percent 
starting in 2013. The annual average of CO2 emissions in the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 forms 
the baseline for “historical” aviation emissions in the European Economic Area.  
Eighty-two percent of aviation emissions allowances are granted for free to aircraft 
operators, and 15 percent are auctioned starting in 2013, with the remaining 3 percent set aside 
for new entrants and fast-growing airlines. The free aviation allowances will be distributed by a 
benchmarking process that accounts for the activity of each operator in 2010 measured in tonne-
kilometres (distance × payload) using a formula that accounts for the total distance traveled and 
the total mass of freight, mail, and passengers carried.16,17 The benchmark (emissions per tonne-
kilometer) is calculated by dividing the total annual amount of free allowances available by the 
                                                 
16 European Commission, 2015f. 
17 European Parliament and Council, 2008. 
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independently verified sum of tonne-kilometer data included in applications from aircraft 
operators to the Commission. In phase 3, the aviation sector cap does not decrease, and aircraft 
operators will also continue to receive the large majority of their emissions allowances for free in 
the manner described.18 The number of aviation emissions allowances in phase 3 (210 
million/year) is relatively small compared with the total number of allocated EUAs (over 2 
billion in 2013). Moreover, through a series of amendments to the original decision, such as 
changing the scope to include only domestic EU flights and exclude flight operators with annual 
emissions below 1,000 tonnes/year, the number of allowances that have actually been allocated 
is even lower—only some 38 million allowances/year. Of these, 6 million are auctioned; the 
remainder is allocated free of charge. 
Aviation allowances cannot be held or surrendered by stationary installation operators 
and are issued to aviation operators only. However, aviation operators can hold and surrender 
both aviation allowances and general allowances if necessary for compliance. In addition, they 
are entitled to use international credits up to a maximum of 1.5 percent of their verified 
emissions during the period from 2013 to 2020.19  
3. Distribution of the Allowance Value  
The introduction of the cap on emissions and the transferability of emissions allowances 
in a market create economic value that flows to the holder of the allowances. In phase 1 and 
phase 2, the asset value was initially distributed almost entirely to incumbent emitting firms. 
Although firms received allowances for free, the market value of allowances was expected to be 
apparent in changes in the prices paid by energy consumers, yielding additional revenue to these 
firms. Firms charge their consumers for the use of allowances because they face an opportunity 
cost in using the allowances for production and forgo the opportunity to sell the allowances in 
the market. In effect, the cost of allowances translates a firm’s emissions into a variable cost of 
production, resembling other factor inputs such as labor and other resources. When allowances 
are distributed for free, the change in revenues from higher product prices will typically be 
greater than the change in costs from reducing emissions and complying with the program, 
resulting in extra-normal or “windfall” profits. Several studies by banks, governments, and 
                                                 
18 European Commission, 2015g. 
19 Environment Agency, 2014a; Environment Agency, 2014b; European Commission, 2015g; and European 
Commission, 2014a. 
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academic teams have found that free allocation led to windfall profits, especially in the 
electricity sector (Nicolai and Zamorano 2014, Laing et al. 2013, Veith et al. 2009, Woerdman et 
al. 2009, Sijm et al. 2006, Bovenberg and Goulder 2000, Burtraw and Palmer 2008) but also 
among industrial firms (Martin et al. 2014).  
Phase 3 marked an important transition by directing the initial distribution of emissions 
allowances away from firms and instead to Member State governments, which can then sell these 
allowances into the market using auctions (Figure 2). The magnitude of that value is illustrated in 
Table 2, which describes the value of allowances that have entered the market, the percentage 
that have been auctioned and the revenues directed to Member States. It is important to note that 
this is a lower bound on the value that will be distributed through an auction because it is 
anticipated that not all allowances set aside for allocation to industry and new entrants will be 
used.20 According to independent market analysts, some 500-900 million allowances are 
expected to be left over by the end of phase 3.21,22 The cumulative volume left over will be 
transferred to the market stability reserve (MSR) at the end of phase 3 in accordance with the 
MSR regulation.23 However, it is not known what happens to these unallocated allowances after 
they are placed into MSR; several alternative policy options are currently being considered.24 In 
addition, auction shares in Figure 2 and Table 2 do not include an important portion of 
allowances directed to the electricity sector. Although these allowances are distributed to power 
generators in the eligible Member States for free, their value should be directed to modernization 
of the electricity sector, which could be viewed as an auction with revenues earmarked to this 
purpose.25 The European Commission takes these aspects into account in estimating that 57 
percent of the total allowances introduced in phase 3 will be distributed through an auction or its 
equivalent.26  This includes back-loaded allowances that are placed into MSR.  
                                                 
20 There is one additional source of unallocated allowances. According to the European Commission, “A third 
category of de facto "unallocated" allowances stems from the application of a carbon leakage factor for sectors not 
on the carbon leakage list, which the legislator has not directed to the MSR” (European Commission, 2015h). 
21 International Emissions Trading Association, n.d. 
22 Note that the European Commission cites a narrower range of 550-700 million (European Commission, 2015h). 
23 European Parliament, 2015a. Market stability reserve is discussed in more detail in section 3.4. 
24 European Commission, 2015h. 
25 These allowances are also subtracted from auction volumes of the eligible Member States (European 
Commission, 2015h). 
26 European Commission, 2015h. 
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A large drop in the total volume of emissions allowances can be noticed between the 
years 2013 and 2014, due primarily to the decision of back-loading allowances (see section 3.4 
for more details). Historical EUA prices were computed as annual averages of December futures 
contract prices. In phase 1 through the beginning of phase 2, most of the reported transactions 
were December futures, but there is little difference between these prices and spot prices over 
this period.27 The table reports projections starting in 2015. Based on projected prices and 
volumes (see section 5 for details of the calculation of the projected prices) in 2018, the auction 
revenue directed to Member States will exceed 50 percent of total asset value of allowances that 
have entered the market, finally overtaking the share that has been directed to free allocation. It 
is noteworthy that the total asset value of allowances continues to increase through 2020, and 
will continue to do so for years thereafter. Even as the quantity of allowances is reduced each 
year the price is expected to increase at a greater rate, so that total asset value of emissions 
allowances grows over time. Further, as noted earlier, some allowances from those intended for 
free allocation to new entrants, industry and efforts to mitigate carbon leakage are expected to 
remain unallocated, and these allowances are likely to ultimately enter the market through an 
auction or distributed for earmarked purposes.  
                                                 
27 Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis, 2010b. 
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Figure 2. Share of Auctioned Allowances in the Total Volume of Allowances that Have 
Entered the Market 
 
Source: Table 2, below. 
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Table 2. The Financial Value and Initial Distribution of Emissions Allowances that Have 
Entered the Market 
 Total volume  
of emissions 
allowances  
(million tonnes) 
Average price 
(2014 €/tonne) 
Total asset 
value 
(billion 2014 €) 
Auction 
revenue 
portion of total 
asset value 
(%) 
Auction 
revenue 
directed to 
Member States 
(billion 2014 €) 
Phase 1      
2005 2,096 27 56.65 <1 <0.01 
2006 2,079 21 43.46 <1 0.14 
2007 2,195 <0.5 0.61 <1 <0.01 
Phase 2      
2008 2,011 25 49.29 3 1.30 
2009 2,049 15 29.90 4 1.16 
2010 2,081 16 32.90 4 1.45 
2011 2,101 14 29.50 4 1.30 
2012 2,170 8 16.75 6 0.97 
Phase 3      
2013 2,109 4 9.28 52 4.83 
2014 1,562 6 9.15 40 3.68 
2015 1,686 8 13.15 39 5.09 
2016 1,737 11 19.11 42 8.05 
2017 1,913 13 24.87 49 12.16 
2018 1,892 14 26.49 50 13.16 
2019 1,867 14 26.14 51 13.24 
2020 1,844 15 27.66 53 14.60 
Notes: Prices and calculated values are based on the weighted average of the observed futures price for December of 
the year in which the futures mature through 2014 and projections starting in 2015. See Appendix 1 for detail. As 
discussed above, the auction share estimated by the European Commission over the entire phase 3 is larger because 
the European Commission includes unallocated allowances, back-loaded allowances, and allowances set aside for 
allocation to power generators in the eligible Member States in the auction share.  
3.1 Auctioning is the Default Mechanism Beginning in Phase 3 but Free Allocation 
Remains Important 
Before phase 3, the ETS prescribed a maximum on the volume of emissions allowances 
that Member States could distribute through an auction. In phase 1 the maximum was 5 percent, 
and in phase 2 it was 10 percent of the total national volume of allowances to be issued. The 
actual share of allowances auctioned was less than 1 percent in phase 1 and varied between 2.6 
13 
percent and 5.8 percent during phase 2. Beginning in phase 3, the use of auctions was adopted as 
the default way of initially distributing emissions allowances.28 The share of allowances 
auctioned amounted to 52.1 percent in 2013, falling to 40.2 percent in 2014 due to back-loading, 
and hence substantial quantities of allowances are still allocated free of charge. Most of these 
flow to industry, but some electricity-producing installations also receive free allowances. These 
shares are summarized in Table 3. 
By an amendment to the Auction Regulation adopted in November 2011, the Member 
States agreed to the Commission’s proposal of “early auctions” of a portion of EU ETS phase 3 
allowances by holding auctions beginning in 2012.29 One of the motives for “early auctions” was 
the perceived need for entities to hedge costs, particularly in the power sector, due to the 
common practice of selling electricity forward and at the same time buying the inputs needed for 
electricity production, including emissions allowances.30 The allowances auctioned in 2012 were 
divided among the Member States as set out in Annex I of the Auction Regulation. The volume 
of “early auction” allowances does not constitute extra allowances for EU ETS phase 3, but is 
instead deducted from the total amount of allowances for the years 2013 and 2014. The volume 
of early auctions was only 90 million allowances. 
                                                 
28 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10(1). 
29 European Commission, 2011a. 
30 European Commission, 2011a, Recital (2). 
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Table 3. Total Initial Distribution of Allowances in Phase 3 (million tons CO2 equivalent) 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total 
Cumulative 
percent of  
the cap 
Auction not including back-loading 898 928 952 932 936 940 946 973 7,505 42.3 (56.6)a 
Back-loadingb  –400 –300 –200     -900 5.8 
 Targeted allocation to electricity 136 97 115 98 81 63 42 0 632 4.1 
Free allocation to industry 760 732 758 756 752 752 749 747 6,006 38.5 
Free allocation to district heatingc 104 94 84 76 68 61 54 48 589 3.8 
New entrants reserve 10 11 76 76 76 76 76 76 477 3.1 
NER 300d 200 100       300 2 
Total for stationary installations 2,108 1,562 1,686 1,737 1,913 1,892 1,867 1,844 14,609  
Cap for stationary installations e 2,084 2,046 2,008 1,970 1,931 1,893 1,855 1,816 15,603 99.6e 
Auctioned to aviation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 48  
Free allocation to aviation 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 256  
Total allocation to aviation 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 304  
Grand Total 2,146 1,600 1,724 1,775 1,951 1,930 1,905 1,882 14,913  
Notes: Values for 2013 and 2014 are reported, other values are projected.  
aThe auction share of 56.6 percent includes 700 million unallocated allowances, 632 million allowances allocated to power generators in eligible Member 
States in 2013-2014 or set aside for this purpose for 2015-2020 , and 900 million back-loaded allowances in accordance with European Commission’s 
methodology (European Commission, 2015h). 
bThese amounts were withdrawn from the amounts to be auctioned in accordance with the Commission Regulation (EU) No 176/2014 (European 
Commission, 2014b) and will be managed in accordance with the market stability reserve provisional regulation discussed in section 3.4. 
cIncludes high-efficiency cogeneration. 
dThe NER300 program has the aim of funding innovative low-carbon energy demonstration projects. 
eThe difference between the total and the cap over phase 3 is due to back-loaded allowances and some unallocated allowances left over in 2013 and 2014 
from targeted allocation to electricity, industry, and new entrants reserve. Source: Authors’ calculations. See Appendix 2 for detail.  
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3.2 The Dominant Approach in the Electricity Sector: Auctioning  
In principle, there should be no free allocation to electricity producers.31 However, the 
provisions of the amended ETS Directive allow some Member States to deviate from this 
principle. Member States with national electricity networks that are poorly connected to the 
international interconnected system for transmission of electricity and with a high dependency on 
a single fossil fuel for their electricity generation were given the option to allocate allowances for 
free to such installations, with an expectation about how the allowance value will be used (see 
“Targeted Electricity Allocation” in Table 2, also known as “optional derogation”).32 The so-
called “Eligible States” that have this opportunity are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Romania. All of the eligible States 
except Malta and Latvia have applied to the Commission for such targeted allocation. Hungary 
stopped using this option after 2013.33 However, the revised ETS Directive stipulates that even 
when the derogation is granted, the level of targeted allocation in 2013 should not exceed 70 
percent of the allowances needed in a Member State to cover emissions for the supply of 
electricity to domestic consumers.34 
Across the eight eligible Member States that took advantage of optional derogation, 
133,059,430 allowances were allocated for free to power generators in 2013, and 100,474,443 
allowances were allocated to the same Member States minus Hungary in 2014.35 Over the period 
2013–2020, the total amount of allowances available for free allocation to power generators in 
the eligible Member States amounts to close to 680 million. The number available will be 
reduced each year, reaching zero in 2020. However, the actual allocated amount might be 
smaller because the eligible Member States can decide to distribute fewer free emissions 
allowances than the maximum amount permitted by the Commission decisions.36 The number of 
allowances allocated in 2013 and 2014 was about 14 percent and 29 percent smaller than the 
maximum amount available in 2013 and 2014, respectively.37 The remaining allowances are to 
                                                 
31 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10a(3). 
32 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10c(1). 
33 European Commission, 2015i. 
34 European Commission, 2011b. 
35 Authors’ calculations. 
36 European Commission, 2015j. 
37 European Commission, 2015j. 
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be issued through auctions by 2020.38 The eligible States are expected to make an investment in 
modernizing their electricity generation that is at least as great as the economic value of free 
allowances to electricity producers. 39 Because the allowance value is linked to specific 
investment priorities, one might conclude this allocation is not free, but is earmarked allowance 
value.  
3.3 Free Allowances for Industry Based on Performance Benchmarks  
The primary logic underlying the use of free allocation to industry is to avoid “carbon 
leakage.” This term describes a situation where costs related to the trading system make 
businesses transfer production to other countries that have laxer constraints on greenhouse gas 
emissions.40 Such transfer of production can lead to decreased economic activity in the EU, 
which in turn could result in higher overall emissions of greenhouse gases if the activities are 
transferred to countries with higher emissions intensity (Fischer and Fox 2012). The risk of 
carbon leakage is highest for energy-intensive industries that face competition from non-EU 
firms.  
Sectors and subsectors that are judged by the Commission to be at a significant risk of 
carbon leakage receive a more generous allocation of free allowances than sectors and subsectors 
not deemed to be exposed to the risk for carbon leakage. The Commission is required to 
determine an official list of the sectors and subsectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk 
of carbon leakage every five years. The first carbon leakage list was adopted at the end of 2009 
and is applicable for the free allocation of allowances in 2013 and 2014.41 The list was amended 
in 2011, 2012, and 2013; it was ultimately adopted in October 2014 and applies for the years 
2015–2019. The criteria used to determine these lists are based on the additional direct and 
indirect costs to be induced by the regulation and the trade intensity of the sector or 
subsector.42,43 
                                                 
38 European Commission, 2015j. 
39 European Commission, 2012b. 
40 European Commission, 2015k. 
41 European Commission, 2015k. 
42 European Commission, 2010a. 
43 European Commission, 2015k. 
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All free allowances set aside for non-electricity-producing manufacturing industries are 
allocated on the basis of product-specific benchmarks. The product-specific benchmarks were 
developed to reflect the most efficient techniques, substitutes, and alternative production 
processes available for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.44 The benchmarks are calculated for 
products rather than for inputs.45 The benchmark methodology does not differentiate according to 
technology or fuel, the size of an installation, or its geographic location.46 The starting point for 
establishing benchmarks was the average performance of the 10 percent most efficient 
installations in a sector or subsector in the EU ETS in the years 2007–2008.47  
There are four methods for calculating the allocations based on benchmarks: product 
benchmarks (estimated to cover around 75 percent of eligible emissions) and three fallback 
approaches: heat benchmark (estimated to cover around 20 percent of eligible emissions), fuel 
benchmark (estimated to cover around 5 percent of eligible emissions), and process emissions 
(estimated to cover less than 1 percent of eligible emissions).48 Each installation that is eligible 
for free allocation will receive allocation based on at least one of these methodologies.49 
However, emissions can be covered by only one methodology.50 Table 4 provides additional 
information about each of these benchmarks.  
                                                 
44 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10a(1), 3rd subparagraph. 
45 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10a(1), 4th subparagraph. 
46 European Commission, 2015l. 
47 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10a(2). 
48 European Commission, 2015m. 
49 European Commission, 2011c. 
50 ECOFYS, 2011. 
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Table 4. Alternative Methods for Assigning Benchmark Allocations 
Methodology Value Unit Conditions Relevant emissions 
Product 
benchmark 
There are 52 
product 
benchmarks 
tCO2 /  
unit product 
- Product benchmark 
available 
Emissions within 
system boundaries of 
product 
Heat 
benchmark 62.3 tCO2 / TJ 
- No product 
benchmark available 
- Heat is measurable 
Emissions relating to 
production of the 
consumed measurable 
heat, not covered by a 
product benchmark 
Fuel 
benchmark 56.1 
tCO2 /  
TJ of fuel 
- No product 
benchmark available 
- Heat is not 
measurable 
- Fuel is combusted 
Emissions originating 
from the combustion 
of fuels, not covered 
by product or heat 
production benchmark 
Process 
emissions 
approach 
97% of 
historical 
emissions 
 
tCO2 
- No product 
benchmark available 
- Heat is not 
measurable 
- Emissions are not 
resulting from 
combustion of fuel 
- Emissions are 
“process emissions” 
All emissions within 
installation not 
covered by previous 
approaches, but not 
including noneligible 
emissions 
Source: European Commission, 2011c. 
A number of additional factors may be applied to the benchmark value to determine the 
actual allocation, including a carbon leakage exposure factor (CLEF) and either a linear 
reduction factor (LRF) or a cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF): 
Allocation = Benchmark × Historical activity level × CLEF × (LRF or CSCF).51 
The carbon leakage exposure factor used for allocation to sectors included on the carbon leakage 
list is 1.00 for all years. For allocation to sectors not on this list, the carbon leakage exposure 
factor is 0.80 in 2013, declining to 0.30 in 2020, with a view to reaching no free allocation in 
                                                 
51 ECOFYS, 2011. 
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2027.52 It should also be noted that due to a special provision, district heating installations that 
have high emissions will be provided with a temporary and declining extra allocation.53  
Finally, the linear reduction factor, as discussed in section 2.1 of this paper, describes the 
rate (1.74 percent) at which the total amount of allowances issued for free shall decrease each 
year from 2013 to 2020. For installations that are identified as electricity generators, as well as 
new entrants, the preliminary total annual amount of free allocation should be reduced each year 
by this factor. For other installations already part of the scheme eligible for free allocation (non-
electricity-producing manufacturing industries), as discussed above, a so-called cross-sectoral 
correction factor can be applied. This is uniform factor, used to ensure that the total amount of 
free allocation to non-electricity-producing manufacturing industries and other relevant 
generators does not exceed the maximum amount of free allocation as determined by the ETS 
Directive.54 Further, an amount less than 5 percent of the cap to be issued for the entire period 
from 2013 to 2020 is set aside as reserve for new entrants.  
3.4 The Structural Surplus of Allowances  
Since 2009, the EU ETS has experienced a growing supply of allowances and 
international credits, which has resulted in surplus of emissions allowances and significantly 
weakened their price.55 By the end of 2013, the surplus had grown further, to over 2.1 billion 
allowances. The low demand for EUAs has been caused by several factors, principally high 
imports of international credits, which currently constitute more than half of the surplus, as well 
as the economic crisis and the associated reduction in economic activity.56,57 Other contributing 
reasons for the low demand include overlapping policies by EU Member States to promote 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, which substitute for fossil generation, and the fact that 
the electricity industry demand for allowances to hedge emissions associated with existing power 
contracts is limited.58  
                                                 
52 European Commission, 2011c. 
53 European Commission, 2015m. 
54 European Commission, 2011c; European Commission, 2013a. 
55 European Commission, 2015n. 
56 European Commission, 2015n. 
57 Carbon Market Watch, 2014. 
58 Burtraw, 2015. 
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Under the EU ETS, existing operators are entitled to use international credits associated 
with the Kyoto mechanism—certified emissions reductions (CERs) under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and emissions reductions units (ERUs) under Joint 
Implementation (JI)—for compliance with EU ETS during the 2008 to 2020 period, with some 
qualitative and quantitative limitations.59  
Credits are accepted from all types of projects except nuclear energy projects, 
afforestation, or reforestation activities. In phase 3, however, credits from projects involving the 
destruction of industrial gases are no longer accepted.60 In addition, newly generated (post-2012) 
international credits may only come from projects in Least Developed Countries, and credits 
issued for emissions reductions that occurred in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol were accepted only until 31 March 2015.61  
Beginning with phase 3, international credits are no longer eligible to be used directly as 
compliance instruments but can be exchanged one-for-one for emissions allowances and used for 
compliance.62 On 22 January 2014, the Commission proposed to exclude international credits 
from the EU ETS starting in phase 4.63 
Table 5 illustrates the surplus buildup since the start of phase 2. It is not anticipated that 
the overall surplus will decline significantly during phase 3. The European Commission and 
many observers are concerned that the surplus and associated low allowance prices risk 
undermining the function of the carbon market to promote innovation and investments in low-
carbon technology. This may affect the ability of the EU ETS to meet more demanding 
emissions reduction targets in the long run.64,65 
                                                 
59 International Carbon Action Partnership, 2015. 
60 European Commission, 2015o. 
61 International Carbon Action Partnership, 2015. 
62 Głowacki Law Firm, 2014. 
63 International Carbon Action Partnership, 2015. 
64 European Commission, 2015n. 
65 Burtraw, 2015. 
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Table 5. Buildup of the Surplus of ETS Allowances  
 
(million EUAs) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Total allocation 2,011 2,049 2,081 2,101 2,170 1,818 1,462 13,692 
Surrendered CERs and 
ERUs 
84 81 137 254 493 13366 * 1,182 
**NER 300      200 100 300 
Early auctions     90   90 
Total supply 2,095 2,130 2,218 2,355 2,753 2,151 1,562 15,264 
Verified emissions from 
stationary installations 2,120 1,880 1,939 1,904 1,867 1,908 1,812 13,430 
Cumulative surplus -25 225 504 955 1,841 2,084 1,834 1,701 
Surplus as share of current 
year verified emissions -1% 12% 26% 50% 99% 109% 101% 14% 
*Not known. 
**The NER300 program has the aim of funding innovative low-carbon energy demonstration projects. 
Source: European Environment Agency, 2015c. 
 
                                                 
66 European Commission, 2013b. 
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As a short-term measure, the Commission postponed the auctioning of 900 million 
allowances (referred to as back-loading) from its initially proposed dates in 2014, 2015, and 
2016 until 2019–2020 (see Table 3). However, a recent regulation cancelled the reintroduction of 
back-loaded allowances to the market in 2019 and 2020.67,68 
The European Parliament has recently approved in first reading the Commission’s 
proposal to establish a market stability reserve with the aim of addressing the allowance surplus 
and adding stability to the system.69 Before coming into force, however, the legislation is to be 
approved by the council of ministers in September 2015.70 
Starting in 2019, the MSR will adjust the auction volumes by automatically placing or 
releasing allowances from the reserve. Whether the reserve is absorbing or releasing allowances 
will depend on the number of allowances in circulation in any given year. If the total number of 
allowances in circulation is fewer than 400 million, then 100 million allowances will be released 
from the reserve and added to the volume of allowances to be auctioned by the Member States. 
In addition, the MSR regulation mandates that allowances that were to be reintroduced into the 
market in 2019 and 2020 in accordance with the 2014 regulation on back-loading and allowances 
that were not allocated to new entrants and installations that ceased or reduced the scope of their 
operations be placed in reserve.71  
4. The Design of the Auction Mechanism of the EU-ETS 
Throughout each element of the ETS there is a growing role for the use of auctions. 
Member States (not the European Union) are responsible for conducting the auctions.72 The 
distribution of the total quantity of allowances to be auctioned among the Member States follows 
these rules:  
a) 88 percent is distributed according to each Member State’s respective share of verified 
emissions in 2005 or the average of the 2005–2007 period, whichever is higher; 73 
                                                 
67 European Commission, 2015n. 
68 European Parliament, 2015a. 
69 European Commission, 2015n. 
70 European Parliament, 2015b. 
71 European Parliament, 2015a. 
72 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10(2). 
73 European Commission, 2015p. 
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b) 10 percent is distributed among the least wealthy Member States for the purpose of 
solidarity and to enhance their prospects for economic growth; 74 and 
c) 2 percent is distributed to those nine Member States that in 2005 had reduced their 
emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 20 percent compared to their respective base 
year under the Kyoto Protocol (the “Kyoto bonus”).75 
Member States determine the use of the revenue generated from the auctioning of their 
allowances, subject to constraints.76 At least 50 percent of the revenue from the auctioning of 
allowances distributed according to (a) and 100 percent of the revenue generated from the 
auctioning of allowances distributed according to (b)–(c) should be used for the purpose of 
combating climate change. Hence, across the ETS, at least 56 percent of the total allowance 
value should be directed to this purpose. The ETS Directive lists policies toward which this part 
of the revenue could contribute, including the following: 
• reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to the impacts of climate change; 
• development of renewable energies and increase in energy efficiency; and 
• implementation of measures to avoid deforestation and promote reforestation in 
developing countries that have ratified the international agreement on climate change. 
The Member States are expected to report to the Commission on their use of the revenue. 
Most Member States have adopted earmarking practices that link specific expenditures to auction 
revenues. In section 5, we summarize these practices.  
4.1 Auction Platforms 
Regulations implementing the use of auctions are directed to ensure that EU ETS 
participants have harmonized, nondiscriminatory, and cost-efficient access to the primary market 
for emissions allowances. Auctions take place only on authorized trading platforms that are 
bound by EU financial market legislation.77  
                                                 
74 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Annex IIa. 
75 The Member States that had achieved this are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The exact division of these allowances is given in Annex IIb of the ETS Directive 
(European Parliament and Council, 2003). 
76 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10(3). 
77 European Commission, 2015p. 
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Member States may consign their allocations to the common auction platform. However, 
Member States also may appoint their own auction platforms, which has been exercised by 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland.78 Opt-out auction platforms must conform to the 
framework set out in the Auctioning Regulation, which provides for further rules to ensure 
adequate coordination between the opt-out auction platforms and the common auction platforms.  
The transitional common auction platform currently used by 25 Member States (Croatia 
is yet to join the platform) is the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig; in this capacity, 
EEX also conducts emissions auctions for Poland during a transitional period. Additionally, EEX 
serves as Germany’s permanent opt-out auction platform;79 the United Kingdom’s opt-out 
platform is ICE Futures Europe (ICE) in London. The 3 European Free Trade Association states 
and Croatia were expected to start auctioning in 2013, but the arrangements with the auction 
platform were not complete. They will begin to auction their cumulated allowances in 2015 on 
the common auction platform as well.80,81 
The transitional common auction platform will be succeeded by a common auction 
platform, to be appointed by tender procedure carried out under the joint procurement agreement 
by the Commission and the 25 participating Member States (Poland and Croatia not included).82 
The maximum appointment duration for any auction platform is five years. The contract for EEX 
as a joint auction platform runs until August 2016.83  
4.2 Auction Design 
The minimum volume exchanged in the auction is labeled one lot. This term has two 
definitions. On a transitional auction platform (see section 4.1), one lot is either 500 or 1000 
allowances, with an allowance enabling emissions of one ton of carbon dioxide. On a permanent 
auction platform, one lot is 500 allowances.84  
                                                 
78 European Commission, 2015q. 
79 European Energy Exchange, n.d. 
80 European Commission, 2015p. 
81 European Commission, 2015q. 
82 European Commission, 2015p. 
83 European Commission, 2015p. 
84 European Commission, 2010b,  Article 6(1). 
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According to the Auction Regulation Chapter II, the allowances shall be offered for sale 
on an auction platform in the form of standardized electronic contracts. It is expressly stated that 
the Member States shall auction the allowances in the form of either “two-day spot” or “five-day 
futures.”85 A two-day spot transaction means allowances are auctioned for delivery at an agreed 
date no later than the second trading day after the day of the auction.86,87 An auction platform 
offers allowances through its regularly recurring bidding window that opens for at least two 
hours and closes on the same trading day. Bidding windows of any two or more auction 
platforms may not overlap, and there must be a two-hour delay between consecutive bidding 
windows.88 Allowances for stationary installations (EUAs) on a common auction platform are 
auctioned at least on a weekly basis.  
The volume of allowances to be auctioned on a common platform is spread evenly over 
the auctions held by that auction platform during a given year, except that the amount of 
allowances auctioned in the month of August is half the amount of allowances auctioned in any 
other month.89 Table 6 shows the timing of auctions for general allowances on all auction 
platforms. 
Table 6. Auction Schedule for General Allowances 
Auction platform States Details 
EEX Participating European Economic 
Area Member States* 
Weekly auctions on Mondays, 
Tuesdays, and Thursdays 
EEX Germany Weekly auctions on Fridays 
ICE United Kingdom Fortnightly auctions on 
Wednesdays 
EEX Poland Once every two months in 2015 
*Excluding those listed below 
Source: European Commission, 2015p. 
                                                 
85 European Commission, 2010b, Article 3(3) and 3(4). 
86 European Commission, 2006,  Article 38(2)(a). 
87 European Commission, 2006,  Article 38(3). 
88 European Commission, 2010b,  Article 8(1). 
89 European Commission, 2010b,  Article 8(5). 
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4.3 Determination of Auction Clearing Price and Resolution of Tied Bids 
Auctions are carried out through a single-round, sealed-bid, and uniform-price format 
whereby bidders submit bids within a specified window of opportunity (single-round), without 
knowing the bids offered by other bidders (sealed-bid).90 Directly following the closure of the 
bidding window, the auction platform determines and publishes the clearing price at which 
demand for allowances equals the number of allowances offered for sale in the auction 
concerned.91 Successful bidders are the ones who have placed bids for allowances at or above the 
clearing price, and they pay the same price for each allowance regardless of the price bid 
(uniform-price).92,93 This is the design used in emissions allowance auctions in the subnational 
programs in North America, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California, and 
Quebec.  
The auction clearing price is determined by the minimum bid at which demand for 
allowances exhausts supply in the auction.94 To determine this price, all submitted bids are 
ordered in descending willingness to pay (bid). Bids are fulfilled starting with the highest bid. 
The price of the bid at which this accumulative sum is equal to or larger than the amount of 
allowances auctioned shall be the auction clearing price.95 In case several bids have the same 
price, these bids are ordered through random selection according to an algorithm determined by 
the auction platform before the auction.96  
5. The Use of Auction Revenues 
Member States determine the use of revenue generated from auctions; however, they face 
expectations embodied in the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council that 
articulates the guideline in phase 3 that at least 50 percent of the revenue should be allocated 
                                                 
90 European Commission, 2010b,  Recital (17) of the preamble. 
91 European Commission, 2015p. 
92 European Commission, 2010b,  Article 5. 
93 European Commission, 2015p. 
94 European Commission, 2010b,  Article 7(1). 
95 European Commission, 2010b,  Article 7(2), 2nd subparagraph. 
96 The motivation for ordering tied bids according to a random process is that “this generates uncertainty for bidders 
making collusion on the price they are bidding unsustainable.”Source: European Commission, 2010b,  Article 7(2), 
1st subparagraph, and Recital (17) of the preamble. 
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toward “energy and climate related” purposes.97 This guideline is applicable for the 88 percent of 
allowances that are distributed according to a Member State’s respective average share of 
verified emissions for the period from 2005 to 2007. In other words, 44 percent of the total 
auction revenue is expected to go to these purposes. Note that this does not include the targeted 
free allocation to electricity in eligible Member States (optional derogation), which also yields 
energy related investments. The definition of energy and climate related purposes includes the 
following items:  
• funding of research and development and demonstration projects for reducing emissions 
and for adaptation; 
• funding of initiatives within the framework of the European Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan and the European Technology Platforms; 
• development of renewable energies to meet the commitment of the Union to using 20 
percent renewable energies by 2020; 
• development of other technologies contributing to the transition to a safe and sustainable 
low-carbon economy; 
• development of technologies that help meet the commitment of the Union to increase 
energy efficiency by 20 percent by 2020; 
• forestry sequestration in the Union; 
• environmentally safe capture and geological storage of CO2; 
• encouragement of a shift to low-emission and public forms of transport; 
• finance research and development in energy efficiency and clean technologies; 
• measures intended to increase energy efficiency and insulation or to provide financial 
support in order to address social aspects in lower and middle income house-holds; 
• coverage of administrative expenses of the management of the ETS; 
• other reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; 
• adaptation to the impacts of climate change; 
                                                 
97 European Parliament and Council, 2009, Article 10(3). 
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• other domestic uses.98 
The final text of the  Directive contrasts with what was initially proposed in 2008, which 
would have directed 20 percent of the revenues to this purpose.99 In growing the share to 50 
percent, the language was inserted that stated the legal and institutional reality that the EU cannot 
actually determine how Member States spend their revenue.100 Further, the amended Directive 
indicates that the goal can be achieved with equivalent financial value, not relying on auction 
revenues directly, making explicit the possibility that spending of auction revenues crowd out 
spending that would have occurred anyway, which is an issue we reserve for further 
investigation. 
Each country is expected to submit a yearly report on how the country has used its 
revenues from the auctions. Figure 3 illustrates Member State ownership of total revenues from 
auctioning of allowances from November 2012 to December 2014. 
                                                 
98 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10(3) and 3d(4). 
99 European Commission, 2008. 
100 We are grateful to A. Denny Ellerman for pointing out the evolution of the Commission’s Directive. 
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Figure 3. Country Shares of Total Auction Revenues, November 2012 to December 2014 
 
Source: European Commission, 2015r. 
Note: This figure does not include the financial value of targeted free allocation to electricity in eight eligible 
Member States. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of auction revenues in relative terms, led by Germany, the 
UK and Italy. However, the countries that receive most of auction revenues are not the countries 
that receive the greatest revenue relative to their GDP in the corresponding year. Figure 4 
displays the relative ranking of Member States with respect to auction revenue in absolute terms 
and as a portion of GDP. Bulgaria, Estonia, and Romania received the greatest amounts 
compared to the size of their GDP in 2013.  
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Figure 4. Rankings of Auction Revenues in Absolute Terms and as Percent of GDP by 
Member State in 2013 
 
Notes: Croatia was excluded because it did not hold auctions in 2013. Data underlying this figure come from 
Appendix Table A1. Appendix Figure A1 is an analogous figure for the year 2014. This figure does not include 
the financial value of targeted free allocation to electricity in eight eligible Member States. 
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Because the Directive mandates only that countries report how they use the 50 percent of 
auction revenues that should be directed to energy and climate related spending purposes, only a 
partial overview of the total spending of auction revenues is possible. The member country 
reports on the use of auction revenue provide various levels of detail—from Hungary describing 
one project for the entire amount to Poland detailing over 300 different projects in their 2013 
reports. Budget processes and regulations also differ among countries. Countries that do not 
practice earmarking (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and 
the UK) add another layer of uncertainty, since their expenditures are not directly traceable.101 
Some of these countries nevertheless provide data on spending of the amount equivalent to at 
least 50% of their auction revenue that is related to climate and energy purposes as outlined in 
articles 3d(4) and 10(3) of the Directive; however, it is noted that this amount does not represent 
all of their spending for such purposes. This suggests the question of whether auction revenue 
spending is additional to what would have happened anyway, or if instead it is crowding out 
other sources of spending for these purposes.  
There is a large variation from country to country in the share of total auction revenue 
that is spent on climate and energy related purposes, and the share does not seem to be associated 
with relative wealth. For example, in 2014, the relatively lower-income countries Lithuania and 
Cyprus reported spending 100 percent of their revenue for these purposes, while Finland reported 
spending about 50 percent. The reason may be that relatively rich countries already have a 
significantly higher baseline level of expenditure on climate and energy related purposes 
compared with relatively poor ones. Figure 5 examines whether the countries that receive the 
biggest amount of auction revenue relative to their GDP also spend the biggest revenue amount 
(relative to their GDP) on climate and energy projects. Indeed, Bulgaria, Romania, and Estonia 
appear at the top. One hypothesis may be that auction revenue provides a unique source of 
revenue for countries with a smaller GDP that enables investment in climate and energy projects.  
                                                 
101 European Commission, 2014c.  
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Figure 5. Rankings of Auction Revenues Relative to GDP and Spending of Auction 
Revenues on Climate and Energy Projects Relative to GDP by Member State in 2013 
 
Notes: Croatia, Belgium, and Italy were excluded. Croatia did not hold auctions in 2013. Belgium does not 
earmark auction revenues and does not provide information on spending an amount equivalent to at least 50 
percent of its auction revenues. Italy did not report on its auction revenue spending in 2013 for technical 
reasons. Data underlying this figure come from Appendix Table A1. As noted in text, this information does not 
include general revenue expenditures on climate and energy programs. Appendix Figure A2 is an analogous 
figure for the year 2014. This figure does not include the financial value of targeted free allocation to 
electricity in eight eligible Member States.  
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A large share of climate and energy spending by Member States is related to energy efficiency 
improvements and investments in renewable energy sources. Energy efficiency improvements 
are primarily focused on renovations of both private and public buildings to decrease energy 
costs. France is an example of a country that has allocated 100 percent of its revenues toward this 
purpose in 2013 and 2014. Spain and Bulgaria allocated most of their revenues to renewable 
energy investments in both years.  
International aid directed toward climate and energy related purposes, although not as 
common as domestic spending, amounted to 15 percent of the total Member States’ climate and 
energy related spending in 2013 and 7 percent in 2014. The countries that used a portion of their 
auction revenue to provide support to other countries in 2013 or 2014 are Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. This aid was split between bi-
lateral and multilateral aid. Estonia, Sweden, and the UK directed all of their aid to developing 
countries through multilateral channels, while Portugal used only bi-lateral channels. 
Interestingly, the Member States providing support to other countries are not the ones for which 
the auction revenue was the biggest relative to their GDP with the exception of Estonia. 
A small part of the total expenditure, but common among member countries, is the use of 
part of the revenue to cover expenses associated with administrating and managing the EU ETS. 
Figure 6 presents the information aggregated for a selection of Member States. Figure 7 presents 
in more detail how the spending on climate and energy related purposes varies across categories 
and Member States.  
Figure 7 indicates there appears to be little change from 2013 to 2014 in spending 
priorities in this area; most countries used their auction revenue to support the same climate and 
energy related projects in 2014 that they financed in 2013. 
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Figure 6. Use or Planned Use of Auctioning Revenues for Climate and Energy Related Purposes  
(based on data availability) 
 
Notes: This figure includes participating Member States with the exception of Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Italy, and Luxembourg. Carry-over amounts from 
previous years spent in the current year are not included. “Unknown” means spent on climate and energy programs, but specific spending category is not 
known. “Research” includes 1) funding of research and development and demonstration projects for reducing emissions and for adaptation and 2) finance 
research and development in energy efficiency and clean technologies. “Energy Efficiency” includes 1) measures intended to increase energy efficiency and 
insulation or to provide financial support in order to address social aspects in lower and middle income households and 2) development of technologies that 
help meet the commitment of the Union to increase energy efficiency by 20 percent by 2020. “Other Domestic Spending on Climate and Energy” includes 1) 
funding of initiatives within the framework of the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan and the European Technology Platforms; 2) development of 
other technologies contributing to the transition to a safe and sustainable low-carbon economy; 3) environmentally safe capture and geological storage of 
CO2; 4) other reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; 5) adaptation to the impacts of climate change; 6) other domestic uses. Data come from Appendix 
Table A2 and A3. This figure does not include the financial value of targeted free allocation to electricity in eight eligible Member States.
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Figure 7. Use or Planned Use of Auctioning Revenues for Climate and Energy Related Purposes by Member State.  
 
Notes: Croatia did not hold auctions in 2013 or 2014. Belgium does not earmark auction revenues and does not provide information on spending an amount 
equivalent to at least 50 percent of its auction revenues. Italy did not provide data for the year 2013 for technical reasons. Austria’s and Luxembourg’s 
reports on their use of auction revenues for the year 2014 are not available as of September 2015. Data come from Appendix Table A2 and A3. This figure 
does not include the financial value of targeted free allocation to electricity in eight eligible Member States. 
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Looking ahead, the stated intentions of countries with respect to the use of revenues may 
vary from the outcome due to policy changes or market changes, including changes in the 
realized price of emissions allowances. However, thus far the ex ante intentions typically have 
been realized. Germany provides an interesting example because it followed through on its 
announced intention to contribute revenues to a climate fund, even supplementing revenue when 
the price of allowances fell and allocating greater than 100 percent of its auction revenues to the 
fund.102 
5.1 Future Auction Revenues and Price Volatility 
The commitment to emissions reduction goals through 2030 provides an indication of the 
future quantity of allowances in the ETS. However, approval of the market stability proposal by 
the European Parliament in July 2015 introduced important changes to the volume of allowances 
that will circulate on the market in the remaining period of phase 3 and in phase 4.103 One of the 
provisions of the new regulation mandates that 900 million of the back-loaded allowances be put 
into the reserve instead of being reintroduced into the market later in this trading period as was 
planned earlier in accordance with the back-loading regulation of 2014. In addition, the 
mechanism of the market stability reserve introduces uncertainty about the annual introduction of 
allowances because the issuance of allowances will depend on the number of unused allowances 
remaining in circulation (as discussed earlier), but when they enter the market they will expand 
the portion that are auctioned compared to free allocation.  
These new developments prompted traders, market analysts, and participants to adjust 
their price expectations. However, the adjusted price forecasts differ significantly among 
different analysts. Figure 8 shows price forecasts by two major energy market analytics 
companies—ICIS Tschach Solutions and Thomson Reuters Point Carbon—as well as by the 
European Commission, that were released after 25 February 2015, when the market stability 
reserve proposal was approved by the environment committee of the European Parliament and 
was finally taking its current shape. Appendix Table A4 provides more information about the 
price forecasts presented in Figure 8. As the figure illustrates, there is substantial uncertainty 
about the price of allowances in the future. Hence, our estimates of total asset value and auction 
revenues directed to Member States for the period 2015–2020 presented in Table 2 in section 3 
                                                 
102 Li and Grießhaber, 2013. 
103 European Parliament, 2015b. 
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need to be interpreted with caution because of uncertainty about both the quantity and the price 
of allowances in the future. 
Figure 8. Forecasts of Allowance Prices 
 
Source: Appendix Table A4.  
*These values provide a connection between this figure and entries in Appendix Table A4.  
**This forecast was used in Table 2 in section 3. 
6. Industry Compensation for Indirect Costs 
Member States are authorized to compensate the most electricity-intensive sectors 
through the national state aid schemes for increases in electricity costs relating to ETS.104 Unlike 
facilities that incur direct costs for their own emissions, which can be compensated through free 
allocation of allowances, facilities that incur indirect costs can receive compensation as a share 
of auction revenue. If a Member State wants to compensate its sectors, it is obliged by law to 
notify the Commission and approval is necessary.105,106 To be considered for compensation, a 
company must be in one of the sectors listed in Table 7.  
                                                 
104 European Parliament and Council, 2003, Article 10a(6). 
105 European Union, 2007, Article 108(3). 
106 The Commission has published guidelines to guarantee that actions are adopted in conformity with the EU's state 
aid rules (European Commission, 2012c; European Commission, 2015k). 
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Table 7. Sectors and Subsectors Deemed Ex Ante to Be Exposed to a Significant Risk of 
Carbon Leakage due to Indirect Emissions Costs  
 
Description 
Aluminium production 
Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals 
Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals 
Lead, zinc, and tin production 
Manufacture of leather clothes 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 
Seamless steel pipes 
Manufacture of paper and paperboard 
Manufacture of fertilisers and nitrogen compounds 
Copper production 
Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals 
Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibers 
Manufacture of man-made fibers 
Mining of iron ores 
Plastics in primary forms 
– Low-density polyethylene 
– Linear low-density polyethylene 
– High-density polyethylene 
– Polypropylene 
– Polyvinyl chloride 
– Polycarbonate 
Manufacture of pulp 
– Mechanical pulp 
Source: European Commission, 2012c. 
The maximum aid that is payable per facility is calculated according to two formulas. 
The first formula applies where electricity consumption efficiency benchmarks have been 
published for a given product: 
Ba = Aia × Ca × Pa × BM × PM  
Where: 
Ba is the maximum aid amount per facility in year a. 
Aia is the aid intensity in year a.  
Ca is the applicable CO2 emissions factor at year a.  
Pa is the EU ETS allowance forward price for year a.  
BM is the applicable product-specific electricity consumption efficiency benchmark.  
PM is the installation’s relevant output. 
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The second formula applies when no product-related electricity consumption efficiency 
benchmarks have been published: 
Ba = Aia × Ca × Pa × EF × SV 
Where: 
EF is the applicable fallback electricity consumption efficiency benchmark, and  
SV is the installation’s relevant electricity consumption. 
 
The value of the aid that is provided cannot exceed 85 percent of the eligible costs 
incurred in 2013, 2014, and 2015; 80 percent in 2016, 2017, and 2018; and 75 percent in 2019 
and 2020. Furthermore, Member States are obliged to demonstrate that the aid is necessary to 
prevent environmental harm—that is, that the aid helps avoid leakage of economic activity that 
might result in emissions increases (carbon leakage). The compensation should further provide 
an incentive for the beneficiary to attempt to reduce emissions and should be essential for the 
beneficiary in order to undertake investment. In addition, it is of high importance that Member 
States demonstrate that the aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary 
to the common interest, especially where the aid is focused on a restricted number of 
beneficiaries or where the aid is likely to reinforce the beneficiaries’ market position. 
As of September 2015, only six Member States—Belgium, Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom—have been granted permission to compensate 
specific industries. The amount of compensation is unpredictable because it varies with the 
allowance price. For instance, in Belgium the total compensation budget from 2013 to 2020 was 
estimated to be from 7 million to 113 million euros, depending on the market price of 
allowances, which was expected to range from 1 to 15 €/ton.107 Moreover, there is interaction 
between the incentive to compensate and the allowance price, since one will affect the other. 
Belgium has tied the compensation budget to the revenue from the auctioning of emissions 
allowances. 
Germany expects to deliver the greatest amount of compensation, with a total budget of 
756 million euros from 2013 to 2015, with the program continuing thereafter until 2020. Eligible 
beneficiaries have to bear a share of their indirect costs for which no aid will be paid out, 
corresponding to the CO2 costs of 1 GWh of electricity consumption per year per installation, 
                                                 
107 European Commission, 2013c.  
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which means that beneficiaries with small installations of less than 1 GWh of consumption per 
year will not receive any aid. Based on the 2012 allowance price, 1 GWh represents a cost of 
about 4,000 euros.108 
Greece, like Belgium, has also tied the budget available for compensation to the revenue 
coming from the auctioning of the emissions allowances; the annual budget is expected to range 
from 14 to 20 million euros (estimated at a price of 5 and 7.5, respectively).109 In the 
Netherlands, the budget was planned to be 78 million euros per year for 2014 and 2015. The 
2014 budget was based on the 2012 CO2 price of 8 EUR/ton; however, the actual price in 2014 
was lower.110 Spanish authorities planned to spend 1 million euros per year in 2013 and 2014 and 
3 million in 2015.111 Finally, the United Kingdom scheme will have a GBP 13 million in 2013 
and GBP 50 million in 2014 and 2015; however, the scheme was expected to extend beyond 
2015.112 
Table 8 presents information regarding the amount of money spent on compensation for 
indirect costs by Member States (note that these data are based on decision texts and are 
therefore “ex ante” data. Data on actual spending on compensation for indirect costs in 2013 are 
not yet available). The mechanism for compensation for indirect cost is not tied to auction 
revenues (although Greece and Belgium have implemented such a link); Member States can 
finance the compensation from any sources in their budgets. This arrangement will remain 
through phase 3. Even after 2021 it seems likely that any link between auction revenues and 
compensation will be voluntary, but there is a proposal to amend the ETS Directive and 
encourage Member States to use auction revenues as the source for compensation. 
The compensation spending as a share of auction revenues varied greatly from a meager 
0.29 percent in Spain to 52.17 percent in Belgium in 2013. However, while the compensation 
schemes are designed to last for a number of years, the actual or planned compensation for 
specific years varies, and hence the figures in Table 8 should not be used as an indicator for 
compensation for other years.  
                                                 
108 European Commission, 2010c. 
109 European Commission, 2014d. 
110 European Commission, 2013d. 
111 European Commission, 2013e. 
112 European Commission, 2013f . 
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Table 8. Member State Spending on Climate and Energy and Provision of Compensation for Indirect Costs Using 
Auction Revenue in 2013  
 
EU-ETS auction 
revenue 
Climate and energy 
spending 
anticipated* 
Anticipated 
compensation 
industry spending** 
Anticipated climate 
and energy spending 
as percent of auction 
revenue 
Anticipated 
compensation 
spending as percent 
of auction revenue 
 (million €) (million €) (million €) (percent) (percent) 
Belgium 115 58 60 50 52 
Germany 790 790 350 100 44 
Greece 148 148 17 100 12 
Netherlands 134 134 0 100 <1 
Spain 346 346 1 100 <1 
United Kingdom 485 485 16 100 3 
Total 2,019 1,904 444 94 22 
Notes: Since Greece and Belgium intended to use their auction revenues to finance industry compensation schemes, their climate spending might have to be 
reduced by the corresponding amount. 
*Based on data from the countries’ reports on their actual and intended use of auction revenues. See Appendix Table A2 for detail. 
**These figures represent what was planned to be spent for this purpose by Member States as stated in decision texts and may not represent the final actual 
amounts spent because the final amount was, in many cases, clearly dependent on carbon price. 
Whenever Member States provided an interval for the anticipated compensation to industry, we took the midpoint of that interval.  
Source: European Commission, 2014c; European Parliament and Council, 2013; European Environment Agency, 2015b; European Commission, 2010c; 
European Commission, 2013c,d,e,f; European Commission, 2014d. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The expanded role of auctions of emissions allowances in phase 3 of the EU ETS meant 
that, for the first time, a substantial share of the total allowances value was directed to Member 
States’ governments. Auctions are a new source of revenue for EU Member States, and these 
revenues, while already worth tens of billions of euros, are likely to grow over time as the cap is 
tightened and other measures to further increase the scarcity of allowances are introduced. There 
is, however, great uncertainty over future allowance prices as reflected by the large variations in 
projections made by commercial market analysts.  
Given the significant and growing value of emissions allowances, understanding the 
effects of how auction revenues are used will be increasingly important. Member States appear 
to fulfill the legal requirement to direct at least 50 percent of auction revenues to “climate and 
energy purposes.” However, the extent to which the funds generated by auctions are additional to 
what otherwise would have been spent on climate and energy cannot be determined from our 
analysis. This is a key area for further study. 
It is not until 2018, however, that auction revenues will exceed 50 percent of the total 
value of annual allocated allowances that have entered the market, despite the amendments 
introduced to make auctioning the default allocation mechanism in the EU ETS. Thus, how the 
remaining (free) allocation is carried out is still important for the performance of the system.  
Nevertheless, the move to auctioning as the default allocation mechanism may carry 
administrative benefits and be more transparent than free allocation. Other changes in the design 
of the EU ETS implemented as of September 2015 represent an improvement of the system as 
well. The centralized allocation process introduced in phase 3 removes the possibility for 
Member States to subsidize domestic firms through over allocation of emissions allowances. The 
expansion of the trading system to include more activities—notably aviation—and greenhouse 
gases other than CO2, also offers potential economic benefits as mitigation costs are equalized 
across a larger share of the economy.  
Perhaps the greatest concern over the EU ETS, at least as expressed in the public debate, 
is the persistently low allowance price in the last five years. Key reasons for the low prices are 
poor projections of future industrial production; limited growth of the European economy in 
general; use of international carbon credits (primarily an unexpected influx of certified emissions 
reduction credits under the Clean Development Mechanism); and subsidies to renewable energy. 
The most straightforward way to increase the scarcity of allowances (and hence increase the 
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price) would be to reduce the cap and consequently the number of allowances available in the 
market. However, this has proven politically impossible, despite efforts in this direction. Instead, 
two other principal measures have been introduced: back-loading and the market stability 
reserve. Back-loading will result in 900 million allowances not entering the market; instead they 
are being put into the reserve. Those allowances are likely to be auctioned or earmarked. The 
flow of allowances entering into the market from the reserve will be based on estimated 
emissions and volumes of allowances in circulation. The extent to which these two measures will 
reach their objectives is still under debate.  
Another concern has been regarding industry compensation. As of 2015, Member States 
are authorized to use state aid measures to compensate large electricity consumers for indirect 
costs caused by the EU ETS. Similar to other state aid measures, this opens up the possibility for 
strategic behavior by Member States to support their own industries. However, only six Member 
States (as of September 2015) have used the compensation opportunity. We do not find support 
for concerns of a “race to the bottom” where Member States subsidize domestic industry and as a 
result increase the total cost of meeting the emissions target. However, since this is a new 
mechanism and more Member States may make use of it in the future, it is too early to dismiss 
the issue of strategic behavior altogether. 
Looking ahead, the European Commission presented in July 2015 a legislative proposal 
to revise the EU Emissions Trading System for the period after 2020, with several changes 
addressing the risk of carbon leakage: revising the system of free allocation to focus on sectors at 
the highest risk of relocating their production outside the EU; a considerable number of free 
allowances set aside for new and growing installations; more flexible rules to better align the 
amount of free allowances with production figures and update of benchmarks to reflect 
technological advances since 2008 (benchmarks are currently not updated nor output based). 113  
In addition, the proposal establishes two new funds: 
1. The Innovation Fund, extending existing support for the demonstration of innovative 
technologies to breakthrough innovation in industry (450 million allowances); 
2. The Modernisation Fund, facilitating investments in modernizing the power sector 
and wider energy systems and boosting energy efficiency in 10 lower-income 
Member States (310 million allowances). 
                                                 
113 European Commission, 2015s 
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Free allowances will also continue to be available to modernize the power sector in the 
lower-income Member States.114,115 
The implemented and proposed changes to the EU ETS expose the continued tension 
between the desire to reduce emissions at least cost and keep the EU ETS as the cornerstone in 
EU mitigation efforts on the one hand, and concerns over international competition, carbon 
leakage, and domestic politics on the other. Although the move to auctioning and the expanded 
scope of the system are positive steps, other changes complicate the picture. Different allocation 
methods to industry, state aid measures, and the introduction of a complex market stability 
reserve may undermine the credibility of the EU ETS. Future adjustments will determine 
whether it will be a clear, predictable, and efficient policy instrument as it was intended to be, or 
a complex array of interacting mechanisms, and whether it contributes to achieving important 
emissions reductions.  
 
                                                 
114 European Commission, 2015s. 
115 European Commission, 2015t. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. 
This Appendix explains authors’ calculations in Table 2. 
Historic values of total volumes of emissions allowances for the years 2005-2014 were 
copied from European Environment Agency (2015c). No scope correction factor was used for 
values in phase 1 and 2.116 Thus, what we have in Table 2 are actual values and not what they 
would have been if EU ETS had had the scope that it has today when it just started. Note that the 
values for the years 2013 and 2014 were slightly adjusted as explained in Appendix 2.  
Values for the years 2015-2020 were copied from Table 3. They represent projected 
totals based on projected shares, and do not generally equal the caps for the corresponding years. 
Auction revenue portion of total asset value is based on shares of auctioned amounts in the total 
volume of allocated allowances, which were also copied from Table 3.  
Average annual historical prices for the years 2005-2014 were computed by taking the 
average of monthly auction prices weighted by monthly auction volumes. The prices are futures 
prices for December of the same year contract. For example, the annual average price for 2008 
represents the weighted average December 2008 futures price in that year. Technically, the 
average December 2008 futures price could be computed as a monthly average of December 
2008 futures prices from the early 2005 up to December 2008. However, we based the average 
only on the prices in the corresponding year following remarks by Ellerman et al. (2010b). In 
other words, the December 2008 futures price in this example would be based only on December 
2008 futures prices in the 12 months of 2008. The futures prices data come from Quandl (n.d.).  
 
                                                 
116 Scope correction can be used to make values comparable across phases by taking into account the extended 
scope of the EU ETS in phases 2 and 3. 
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Appendix 2. 
This Appendix explains authors’ calculations in Table 3.  
We copied the 2013 cap from European Commission (2015d) and reduced it by 1.74 
percent annually to calculate the caps for the years 2014-2020. We know that 1) the base for the 
1.74% reduction factor is the historical average of emissions in the years 2008-2012; and 2) the 
reduction factor is linear, not compound, that is, the reduction factor is the same in absolute 
terms for all years in phase 3, and it equals 38,264,246.117 For example, to calculate the cap for 
2014, we took the 2013 cap and subtracted 38,264,246. Similarly, to calculate the cap for 2015, 
we took the 2014 cap and subtracted the same number again, and so on.  
For the years 2013 and 2014, from European Environment Agency (2015c) we copied the 
values “1.3 Allowances auctioned or sold (EUAs and EUAAs)” into the “Auction” row, “1.1.1 
Free allocation to existing entities (Art. 10a(1))” into the “Free Allocation to Industry” row, 
“1.1.2 Free allocation from the new entrants reserve (Art. 10a(7))” into the “New Entrants” row, 
and “1.1.3 Free allocation for modernization of electricity generation (Art. 10c)” into the “Free 
Allocation to Electricity” row. Then we summed up these four values in the 2013 and 2014 
columns that we copied from European Environment Agency (2015c) and verified that they are 
equal to the values reported in European Environment Agency (2015c) in the column “1. Total 
allocated allowances (EUAs or EUAAs)”.  
Allocations to district heating are not reported in a separate column in European 
Environment Agency (2015c). We copied district heating allocation for the years 2013-2020 
from European Commission (2013g). Then, we returned to the row “Free allocation to industry” 
and modified the values for 2013 and 2014 by subtracting the values for district heating that we 
had just copied from the decision text.  
It is necessary to modify the “Auction” row to account for the NER300 program because 
the 300 million NER300 EUAs were included into the auction volumes for the years 2013 and 
2014 that we copied from European Environment Agency (2015c). This can be confirmed based 
on the last two rows in Table 8 in European Environment Agency (2015a). We copied the 
                                                 
117 European Commission, 2015d. 
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NER300 values into the corresponding row in our Table 3. Then we subtracted those values from 
the values in the “Auction” row.118  
There are several other adjustments we could have made to the 2013 and 2014 columns.  
In 2012, the so-called “early auctions” of the third trading period were held. The volumes 
of these auctions were equal to 90 million EUAs and are added to the 2013 auctioning volumes 
in the data in European Environment Agency (2015c).119 Thus, there was no need to adjust the 
2013 auction volume by 90 million.  
We filled out the rest of the table with ex-ante values.  
We copied the auction volume for the year 2015 from European Commission (2014e). 
That amount had already been adjusted for back-loading and it does include 11,328,500 and 
19,470,500 allowances to be auctioned by Croatia and the EEA-EFTA States, respectively, for 
the years 2013 to 2015, for which auctioning is still to start.  
It is important not to double-count the amount set aside to be auctioned for Croatia in the 
years 2013-2015. According to European Commission (2014e), the whole Croatia’s 2013-2015 
amount was included into the 2015 auction volume. According to European Environment 
Agency (2015a), even though  
"Croatia has been part of the EU ETS since 2013, it only started 
auctioning in 2015, since the necessary arrangements between the EEX, which 
serves as the transitional common auction platform, and the Croatian auctioneer 
had not been in place before-hand. In 2015, Croatia is set to auction a total 
amount of 11 328 500 EUAs. This amount represents 4 900 000, 3 012 000, and 3 
416 500 allowances that were to be auctioned in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 
respectively. Therefore, the data viewer includes those amounts for the years 2013 
and 2014 (2015 to be included next year)."  
Thus, in order to avoid double-counting, we subtracted Croatia's allowances for the years 
2013 and 2014 from the auction volumes for 2013 and 2014 that we copied from European 
Environment Agency (2015c) as those amounts had already been included into the 2015 auction 
volume. We subtracted 4 900 000 and 3 012 000 from the auction volumes for the years 2013 
                                                 
118 Technically, the first portion of 200 million NER300 EUAs was sold by the European Investment Bank between 
December 5, 2011 and September 28, 2012 and the second portion of 100 million EUAs was sold between 
November 14, 2013 and April 11, 2014 (European Investment Bank, 2014).  
119 European Environment Agency, 2015a. 
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and 2014, respectively. We verified that these amounts were included into the 2013 and 2014 
auction volumes by examining Table 8 in European Environment Agency (2015a). Then we 
summed up all values (excluding the annual cap) in the columns for the years 2013 and 2014. 
Checking whether we had to make a similar adjustment for the three EEA-EFTA 
countries, we read in European Environment Agency (2015a) that 
"For Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, a different approach is suggested. 
These countries are also set to auction on the transitional common auction 
platform, but similarly to Croatia, the necessary arrangements have not been in 
place. However, whilst Croatia has started auctioning in 2015, the three EEA-
EFTA states have not done so. This is why their cumulated withheld amount of 19 
470 500 is not displayed in the data viewer yet. It will be included – and 
distributed between years, according to the Croatian case – once these countries 
have carried out their first EUA auction."  
Thus, EEA-EFTA amount of 19,470,500 is counted only once - in the 2015 auction 
volume. We double-checked by examining Table 8 in European Environment Agency (2015a).  
We copied the amounts for the years 2016-2020 into the “Auction” row from European 
Commission (2015p). Those numbers take into account the back-loading regulation of 2014 but 
not the market stability reserve regulation of 2015. Thus, we subtracted 300 million from the 
2019 auction value and 600 million from the 2020 auction value.  
Using Figure 3 in CDC Climat Research (2013) we copied the values from the 
“Transitional free allocation – 8 countries” row of the figure into the “Free Allocation to 
Electricity” row of our table for the years 2015-2020. The values for the years 2013 and 2014 as 
reported in this source are higher than the values we copied from European Environment Agency 
(2015c). This is because what we copied from CDC Climat Research (2013) represents the 
maximum amount set aside in the decision text, whereas the European Environment Agency 
(2015c) values were actual amounts allocated to electricity generators.120  
Then we copied the values from the “Estimated benchmark allocation” row (from the 
same Figure 3 in CDC Climat Research) into the “Free Allocation to Industry” row for the years 
2015-2020. These amounts include amounts set aside for allocation to district heating, so we 
subtracted district heating values.  
                                                 
120 See European Commission, 2014f and 2015u. 
58 
The “New Entrants” row for the years 2015-2020 could be calculated as 5% of the annual 
cap. (This is what was actually done in Figure 3 in CDC Climat Research, but annual caps in 
Figure 3 are slightly different). Thus, the total amount set aside for New Entrants for Phase 3 
(2013-2020) should add up to about 780 million allowances (which equals 5% of the total 
emissions cap in phase 3). However, according to the most recent update of July 2015, the New 
Entrants Reserve for phase 3 originally had only 480.2 million allowances because 300 million 
allowances were deducted from the original amount for the NER300 program.121 We subtracted 
the 2013 and 2014 New Entrants allocations of 10.19 and 11.46 million, respectively, from 480.2 
to get 458.55 million allowances available for the years 2015-2020 and divided that number by 6 
to get 76.425 million allowances available for New Entrants in each year of the 2015-2020 
period. Ideally, New Entrants allocation in phase 3 would start with a higher number and then 
would be reduced by 1.74% each year; however, what matters is that the total maximum possible 
New Entrants allocations for the years 2015-2020 add up to 458.55. Also, according to European 
Commission (2015v), some unallocated allowances will be transferred to the market stability 
reserve. We did not make adjustments for unallocated allowances in Table 3.  
Finally, we summed up the values in each column (excluding the annual cap) to get the 
totals. 
                                                 
121 European Commission, 2015v. 
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Table A1. Auction Revenues and Auction Revenue Spending on Climate and Energy 
Programs as Percent of GDP by Member State 
 
Auction Revenues as  
Percent of GDP 
Auction Revenue Spending as 
Percent of GDP 
Country 2013 2014 2013 2014 
Austria 0.010%  0.006%  
Belgium 0.016% 0.014%   
Bulgaria 0.073% 0.049% 0.071% 0.049% 
Croatia     
Cyprus 0.006% 0.002% 0.006% 0.002% 
Czech Republic 0.029% 0.020% 0.026% 0.010% 
Denmark 0.013% 0.011% 0.013% 0.011% 
Estonia 0.055% 0.022% 0.027% 0.011% 
Finland 0.019% 0.018% 0.009% 0.009% 
France 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 
Germany 0.016% 0.015% 0.016% 0.015% 
Greece 0.046% 0.042% 0.046% 0.042% 
Hungary 0.020% 0.031% 0.010% 0.007% 
Ireland 0.014% 0.011% 0.014% 0.011% 
Italy 0.014% 0.014%  0.007% 
Latvia 0.026% 0.024% 0.026% 0.024% 
Lithuania 0.032% 0.027% 0.032% 0.027% 
Luxembourg 0.006%  0.003%  
Malta 0.035%  0.022%  
The Netherlands 0.012% 0.011% 0.012% 0.011% 
Poland 0.035% 0.011% 0.018% 0.005% 
Portugal 0.024% 0.022% 0.024% 0.021% 
Romania 0.049% 0.037% 0.036% 0.037% 
Slovakia 0.048% 0.043% 0.048% 0.043% 
Slovenia 0.028% 0.025% 0.014% 0.013% 
Spain 0.019% 0.018% 0.019% 0.018% 
Sweden 0.005% 0.004% 0.005% 0.002% 
United Kingdom 0.014% 0.010% 0.014% 0.010% 
Notes: Following a note by European Commission (2014c), we set Finland’s spending of auction revenues on 
climate and energy projects in 2013 equal to 50% of its auction revenues in 2013; and Latvia’s and Slovakia’s 
spending of auction revenues on climate and energy programs in 2013 equal to 100% of their auction revenues 
in 2013. In addition, in this table Latvia’s and Slovakia’s spending of auction revenues on climate and energy 
programs in 2014 was also set to 100% of their auction revenues in 2014. 
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Table A2. Auction Revenues and Auction Revenue Spending by Member State in 2013 
 Revenue, 1000s euros Expenditure, 1000s euros 
Country (numbers 
indicate a key to notes 
at the end of the table) 
Total Auction 
Revenue 
Revenue 
from 
Auctioning of 
General 
Allowances 
Revenue 
from 
Auctioning of 
Aviation 
Allowances 
Carry-over 
Amount (1) 
Total Amount Spent on 
Climate & Energy 
Projects from Total 
Auction Revenue 
Received in 2013 
Total Amount Not Spent 
on Climate & Energy 
Projects from Total 
Auction Revenue 
Received in 2013 
Additional Amount 
Spent on Climate & 
Energy Projects in 2013 
not from Auction 
Revenue Received in 
2013 (2) 
Austria (4)  55,752 55,752   36,904 18,848  
Belgium (5)  114,992 114,992      
Bulgaria  52,629 52,629  22,138 51,294 1,335  
Croatia (6)         
Cyprus  1,928 1,928   1,928   
Czech Republic (7)  80,686 80,686   73,150 7,536  
Denmark (8)  56,045 56,045   56,045   
Estonia (9)  18,074 18,074   9,037 9,037  
Finland  66,970 66,970   33,485 33,485  
France  219,247 219,247   219,247   
Germany (10)  790,292 790,292  195,000 790,292  195,872 
Greece  147,638 147,638   147,638   
Hungary (11)  34,592 34,592   17,296 17,296 168 
Ireland  41,677 41,677   41,677   
Italy (12)  385,890 385,890  76,497    
Latvia  10,792 10,792  2,129 10,792   
Lithuania (13)  19,978 19,978  3,286 19,978   
Luxembourg  4,985 4,985  368 2,493 2,493  
Malta (14)  4,466 4,466   2,869 1,597 1 
The Netherlands  134,238 134,238   134,238   
Poland   244,022 244,022   128,677 115,345 4 
Portugal (15)  72,782 72,782   71,402 1,380 2,421 
Romania (16)  122,736 122,736   91,172 31,564  
Slovakia  61,703 61,703  12,183 61,703   
Slovenia (17)  17,739 17,739  3,512 8,889 8,850  
Spain (18)  346,111 346,111  68,533 346,111  68,531 
Sweden (19)  35,700 35,700   35,700   
United Kingdom (20)  485,361 485,361   485,361   
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Table A2 continued 
 Expenditure of Auction Revenues by Spending Category, 1000s euros 
Country (numbers 
indicate a key to 
notes at the end of 
the table) 
Unknown 
(3) 
Forestry 
Sequestration 
Other 
Reduction 
of 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Emissions 
Funding of 
Research and 
Development 
and 
Demonstration 
Projects 
ETS 
Management 
Measures Intended to Increase 
Energy Efficiency in order to 
Address Social Aspects in Lower 
and Middle Income Households 
Finance 
Research and 
Development 
in Energy 
Efficiency 
Development 
of 
Renewable 
Energies 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Austria (4)       29,804   
Belgium (5)          
Bulgaria         51,294 
Croatia (6)          
Cyprus  1,395 300 66 89 78    
Czech Republic (7)       73,150   
Denmark (8)     28,023     
Estonia (9)  1        
Finland          
France       219,247   
Germany (10)     632,000 17,376    
Greece  147,638        
Hungary (11)       168   
Ireland   24,969   1,228 15,480   
Italy (12)          
Latvia  10,779    13    
Lithuania (13)  1    1,092   3,464 
Luxembourg  2,493        
Malta (14)         2,789 
The Netherlands  134,238        
Poland    157  41 4,091 25,514 18 44,533 
Portugal (15)   4,479  5,188 826  1,331 55,900 
Romania (16)  3 7,836       
Slovakia  61,641    62    
Slovenia (17)  4,331    4   579 
Spain (18)    17,429     373,178 
Sweden (19)  17,800   1,100    9,900 
United Kingdom (20)     89,517 827 123,368  74,259 
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Table A2 continued 
 Expenditure of Auction Revenues by Spending Category, 1000s euros 
Country (numbers 
indicate a key to 
notes at the end of 
the table) 
Other 
Domestic/EU 
Uses 
Development 
of Other 
Technologies 
Development 
of 
Technologies 
to Increase 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Funding of 
Special 
Initiatives 
Adaptation to 
the Impacts 
of Climate 
Change 
Sustainable 
Transport 
Capture and 
Storage of 
CO2; 
Support to 
Developing 
Countries 
Support to 
Countries 
Other Than 
Developing 
Countries 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Austria (4)         7,100  
Belgium (5)           
Bulgaria           
Croatia (6)           
Cyprus           
Czech Republic (7)           
Denmark (8)         28,023  
Estonia (9)    9,036       
Finland         33,485  
France           
Germany (10)  94,000       240,204 2,584 
Greece           
Hungary (11)  17,296         
Ireland           
Italy (12)           
Latvia           
Lithuania (13)    15,421       
Luxembourg           
Malta (14)    81       
The Netherlands           
Poland   219 30,346 21,596   2,166    
Portugal (15)  1,045     2,633  2,421  
Romania (16)       83,333    
Slovakia           
Slovenia (17)       3,975    
Spain (18)   17,182    6,853    
Sweden (19)       6,900    
United Kingdom (20)        9,094 188,296  
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Notes: All amounts in columns (1) through (14) are disbursed amounts unless noted otherwise. Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the UK do not earmark auction revenues. 
Greece and Luxembourg did not provide data on climate and energy spending by category, but Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, and the UK provide data on spending an amount equivalent to at least 50% 
of their auction revenues.  
Following European Commission (2014c), Finland’s spending on climate and energy programs was set equal to 
50% of its auction revenues; Latvia’s and Slovakia’s spending on climate and energy related purposes was set 
equal to 100% of their auction revenues.  
(1) Total amount of auctioning revenues generated, or the equivalent in financial value committed in years 
before 2013, generated and not disbursed in the years before the year 2013, and carried-over for disbursement in 
the year 2013. 
(2) This amount was included by countries in their reported amount in columns 1-16. For Germany and Spain, 
this amount is almost equal to their carry-over amount from 2012. For other countries it reflects an 
inconsistency between the sum of the amounts in columns 1-16 and the amount that they reported in the column 
"Total Amount Spent on Climate & Energy Projects from Total Auction Revenue Received in 2013". 
(3) This amount was included by countries into the column "Total Amount Spent on Climate & Energy Projects 
from Total Auction Revenue Received in 2013" but not in the amounts reported in columns 1-16. 
(4) Disbursed: 0. 
(5) In accordance with the Belgian special law of January 16, 1989 Art. 65 quarter §7, as modified by the 
Belgian special law of January 6, 2014, the revenues of the Belgian auctioning must be distributed between the 
federal government and the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capital regional governments in accordance with a 
cooperation agreement to be concluded between these four governments. As no cooperation agreement on the 
distribution of the revenues has been concluded so far, the revenues remain blocked on an account and cannot 
be used for any purpose. 
(6) No auctions have been held yet. 
(7) Disbursed: 0. 
(8) Disbursed: 0. 
(9) The amount in column (10) is also associated with column (2). 
(10) Disbursed: 649,376,000. The amount in column (3) is also associated with columns (1), (2), (5), (6), (7), 
(9), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14). 
(11) Disbursed: 0.  
(12) Auction revenues were not allocated in 2013 for technical reasons. 
(13) Disbursed: 282,000. The amount in column (10) is also associated with column (5). The amount in column 
(4) is also associated with column (8). 
(14) Disbursed: 1,070,000. 
(15) The amount in column (3) is also associated with column (11). 
(16) Disbursed: 0. 
(17) Slovenia claims to have spent 8,889,000 on climate and energy. 
(18) Disbursed: 373,556,000. 
(19) Sweden claims to have spent 100% of its auction revenues on climate and energy. The amount in column 
(3) is also associated with columns (7), (9), (10). The amount in column (7) is also associated with columns (9) 
and (10).  
(20) The amount in column (3) is also associated with column (6). 
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Table A3. Auction Revenues and Auction Revenue Spending by Member State in 2014 
 Revenue, 1000s euros Expenditure, 1000s euros 
Country (numbers 
indicate a key to notes 
at the end of the table) 
Total Auction 
Revenue 
Revenue 
from 
Auctioning of 
General 
Allowances 
Revenue 
from 
Auctioning of 
Aviation 
Allowances 
Carry-over 
Amount (1) 
Total Amount Spent on 
Climate & Energy 
Projects from Total 
Auction Revenue 
Received in 2014 
Total Amount Not Spent 
on Climate & Energy 
Projects from Total 
Auction Revenue 
Received in 2014 
Additional Amount 
Spent on Climate & 
Energy Projects in 2013 
not from Auction 
Revenue Received in 
2014 (2) 
 Austria            
 Belgium (4)  97,079 97,079      
 Bulgaria  36,415 36,192 223 23,473 36,192 223  
 Croatia (5)         
 Cyprus  730 730  431 730   
 Czech Republic (6)  55,710 55,243 467 69,008 26,925 28,785  
 Denmark (7)  48,090 46,927 1,163  48,090   
 Estonia (8)  7,447 7,409 38  3,623 3,824  
 Finland  63,496 62,683 813  31,113 32,383  
 France  215,345 215,345   215,345   
 Germany (9)  749,983 749,983  94,149 749,983  96,831 
 Greece (10)  131,070 129,971 1,098  131,070   
 Hungary (11)  56,499 56,210 288 23 13,102 43,397  
 Ireland  35,982 35,110 872  35,982   
 Italy (12)  408,567 403,318 5,249 428,019 192,767 215,800  
 Latvia  10,224 10,083 141 12,897 10,224   
 Lithuania (13)  17,340 17,282 58 22,982 17,340  22,982 
 Luxembourg          
 Malta (14)  3,915 3,815 100 1,800 3,915  1,771 
 The Netherlands   131,101 125,632 5,470  131,101   
 Poland (15)  78,010 78,010   39,024 38,986 3 
 Portugal (16)  67,095 65,822 1,273  64,849 2,246 161 
 Romania (17)  97,890 97,568 322 23,897 97,890   
 Slovakia  57,635 57,591 45 73,824 57,635   
 Slovenia (18)  16,642 16,642  8,321 8,321 8,321 806 
 Spain (19)  330,097 323,532 6,564 26,620 330,097  40,120 
 Sweden  33,598 32,575 1,023  18,939 14,659  
 United Kingdom (20)  401,504 387,425 14,079  401,504   
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Table A3 (continued) 
 Expenditure of Auction Revenues by Spending Category, 1000s euros 
Country (numbers 
indicate a key to 
notes at the end of 
the table) 
Unknown 
(3) 
Forestry 
Sequestration 
Other 
Reduction 
of 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Emissions 
Funding of 
Research and 
Development 
and 
Demonstration 
Projects 
ETS 
Management 
Measures Intended to Increase 
Energy Efficiency in order to 
Address Social Aspects in Lower 
and Middle Income Households 
Finance 
Research and 
Development 
in Energy 
Efficiency 
Development 
of 
Renewable 
Energies 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Austria           
Belgium (4)          
Bulgaria        20,605 
Croatia (5)          
Cyprus  332 200 27 87 84    
Czech Republic (6)  1     25,195 1,729  
Denmark (7)     24,045     
Estonia (8)         3,200 
Finland          
France       215,345   
Germany (9)     733,874 16,109    
Greece (10)  1       131,069 
Hungary (11)       13,102   
Ireland      1,131   699 
Italy (12)      2,887 85,300   
Latvia  10,117    107    
Lithuania (13)      455 28,948  10,919 
Luxembourg           
Malta (14)       135  5,330 
The Netherlands   131,101        
Poland (15)     6,655  30,820  1,552 
Portugal (16)   4,500  6,849 975   49,246 
Romania (17)  30,573        
Slovakia  42,624    58 14,953   
Slovenia (18)      27    
Spain (19)         320,750 
Sweden          
United Kingdom (20)     80,601 547   192,893 
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Table A3 (continued) 
 Expenditure of Auction Revenues by Spending Category, 1000s euros 
Country (numbers 
indicate a key to 
notes at the end of 
the table) 
Other 
Domestic/EU 
Uses 
Development 
of Other 
Technologies 
Development 
of 
Technologies 
to Increase 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Funding of 
Special 
Initiatives 
Adaptation to 
the Impacts 
of Climate 
Change 
Sustainable 
Transport 
Capture and 
Storage of 
CO2; 
Support to 
Developing 
Countries 
Support to 
Countries 
Other Than 
Developing 
Countries 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Austria            
Belgium (4)           
Bulgaria 15,587         
Croatia (5)           
Cyprus           
Czech Republic (6)           
Denmark (7)         24,045  
Estonia (8)         423  
Finland         31,113  
France           
Germany (9)  94,149       1,770 912 
Greece (10)           
Hungary (11)           
Ireland   608      33,544  
Italy (12)         104,580  
Latvia           
Lithuania (13)           
Luxembourg            
Malta (14)    221       
The Netherlands            
Poland (15)           
Portugal (16)  419       3,021  
Romania (17)       67,317    
Slovakia           
Slovenia (18)       9,100    
Spain (19)   38,200    11,267    
Sweden         18,939  
United Kingdom (20)        54,567 72,896  
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Notes: All amounts in columns (1) through (14) are disbursed amounts unless noted otherwise. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the UK do not earmark auction revenues. Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, and the UK generally provide data on spending an amount equivalent to at least 
50% of their auction revenues. However, Austria and Luxembourg have not submitted their reports on the use of 
auction revenues in 2014 (as of September 2015). 
Latvia’s and Slovakia’s spending on climate and energy related purposes was set equal to 100% of their auction 
revenues.  
(1) Total amount of auctioning revenues generated, or the equivalent in financial value committed in years before 
2014, generated and not disbursed in the years before the year 2014 and carried-over for disbursement in the year 
2014. 
(2) This amount was included by countries in their reported amount in columns 1-16. For Cyprus, Germany, 
Lithuania, Malta, and Spain this amount is close to their carry-over amount. For other countries it reflects an 
inconsistency between the sum of the amounts in columns 1-16 and the amount that they reported in the column 
"Total Amount Spent on Climate & Energy Projects from Total Auction Revenue Received in 2014". 
(3) This amount was included by countries into the column "Total Amount Spent on Climate & Energy Projects 
from Total Auction Revenue Received in 2014" but not in the amounts reported in columns 1-16. 
(4) In accordance with the Belgian special law of January 16, 1989 Art. 65 quarter §7, as modified by the Belgian 
special law of January 6, 2014, the revenues of the Belgian auctioning are distributed between the federal 
government and the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capital regional governments in accordance with a cooperation 
agreement to be concluded between these four governments. As no cooperation agreement on the distribution of the 
revenues has been concluded so far, the revenues remain blocked on an account and cannot be used for any purpose. 
(5) No auctions have been held yet. 
(6) Disbursed: 1,236,000. 
(7) Disbursed: 0. 
(8) The amount in column (7) is also associated with columns (10) and (2).  
(9) The amount in column (3) is also associated with columns (1), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (13), and (14). 
(10) Disbursed: 0. 
(11) Disbursed: 0. Also, there might be a mistake in the carry-over amount. The amount in column (5) is also 
associated with column (12). 
(12) Disbursed: 2,887,000.  
(13) Disbursed: 2,799,000. The amount in column (4) is also associated with column (8).  
(14) Disbursed: 5,351,000. 
(15) The amount in column (3) is also associated with columns (11) and (12). The amount in column (7) is also 
associated with column (9).  
(16) The amount in column (3) is also associated with columns (1), (11), and (13). 
(17) Disbursed: 43,399,000. Romania claim to have spent 100% of its auction revenues on climate & energy but it 
might be a mistake. 
(18) Disbursed: 27,000. Slovenia claims to have spent 8,321,000 on climate and energy but it might be a mistake. 
(19) Disbursed: 308,611,000. The amount in column (9) is also associated with column (12). The amount in column 
(13) is also associated with column (2). 
(20) The amount in column (3) is also associated with column (6). 
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Table A4. Forecasts of Allowance Prices (data for Figure 8) 
Predicted price and assumptions Analyst, source, date 
The survey responses were received between Feb. 
20 and Mar. 15. 
€8.90 Average, 2015 
€10.80 Average, 2016 
€11.00 Average, 2017 
€11.60 Average, 2018 
€14.40 Average, 2019 
€16.80 Average, 2020 
€8.60 Median, 2015 
€9.50 Median, 2016 
€9.08 Median, 2017 
€9.83 Median, 2018 
€10.77 Median, 2019 
€13.31 Median, 2020 
Thomson Reuters Point Carbon Poll of 10 market 
analysts, April 15, 2015122,123 
 
€7.80 by 2015 
€11.00 by 2016 
€13.00 by 2017 
€14.00 by 2018 
€14.00 by 2019 
€15.00 by 2020 
€17.00 by 2021 
€19.00 by 2022 
€20.00 by 2023 
€22.00 by 2024 
€24.00 by 2025 
€25.00 by 2026 
€26.00 by 2027 
€28.00 by 2028 
€29.00 by 2029 
€30.00 by 2030 
Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, June 18, 2015124  
 
These prices appear in Table 2. 
€ 25.40 ”European Commission are expecting an 
average price in Phase IV of as much as…” 
European Commission, as cited in Redshaw 
Advisors ltd, July 15, 2015  
€22/tCO2e by 2020 “an average of analyst 
forecasts…” 
European Daily Carbon Markets (EDCM 12 May 
2015) by ICIS, June 12, 2015 as cited by Lee (2015) 
                                                 
122 Garside, 2015. 
123 Szabo, 2015a.  
124 Szabo, 2015b. 
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at least €9 by 2020 ”76% of 457 respondents 
said…” 
above €11 by 2020 ”More than 50% predict…” 
above €15 by 2020 ”23% say…” 
Thomson Reuters Point Carbon annual survey of 
European carbon market participants and 
observers, May 13, 2015125 
€19/t 2020, €32/t by 2030 Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, May 11, 2015126 
€31 in 2020 and around €39 in 2030, taking into 
account a 2019 MSR start and back-loading in 
reserve 
Icis Tschach Solutions, February 25, 2015127 
 
                                                 
125 Garside, 2015.  
126 Climate Policy Observer, 2015. 
127 ICIS, 2015.  
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Figure A1. Rankings of Auction Revenues in Absolute Terms and as Percent of GDP by 
Member State in 2014 
 
Notes: Croatia was excluded because it did not hold auctions in 2014. Austria was excluded because it has not 
submitted its report on the use of auction revenues for the year 2014 (as of September 2015). No GDP data for the 
year 2014 was available for Malta and Luxembourg from the World Bank (as of September 2015). Data underlying 
this figure come from Appendix Table A1. This figure does not include the financial value of targeted free allocation 
to electricity in eight eligible Member States. 
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Figure A2. Rankings of Auction Revenues Relative to GDP and Spending of Auction 
Revenues on Climate and Energy Projects Relative to GDP by Member State in 2014 
 
Notes: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Malta and Luxembourg were excluded. Data underlying this figure come from 
Appendix Table A1. As noted in text, this information does not include general revenue expenditures on climate and 
energy programs. This figure does not include the financial value of targeted free allocation to electricity in eight 
eligible Member States.  
